Klok Law Firm, LLC — Personal Injury & Litigation-June 4, 2026
Arbitration clauses are everywhere — in gym memberships, nursing-home and assisted-living admission packets, adult day-care enrollment forms, car-purchase paperwork, and the fine print of online "terms and conditions." When a dispute later arises, the business often points to that clause and asks a court to send the case out of the courtroom and into private arbitration, away from a jury.
But an arbitration clause is only as strong as the agreement behind it. South Carolina law makes that especially clear in a setting families encounter all the time: when a spouse, parent, or adult child signs intake paperwork "on behalf of" a loved one. The headline rule may surprise you — under South Carolina law, even a formal power of attorney can be insufficient to bind a person to an arbitration agreement.
Arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion
South Carolina courts begin with a simple premise: arbitration rests on agreement. "Arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit." Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d 110, 118 (2001). And contrary to a widespread misconception, our Supreme Court has confirmed there is no special public policy "favoring" arbitration over the courthouse — a court enforces an arbitration clause exactly as it enforces any other contract term, no more and no less. Palmetto Constr. Grp., LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC, 432 S.C. 633, 639, 856 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2021).
Two consequences follow. First, when the person resisting arbitration never signed the agreement, a presumption against arbitration applies. Wilson v. Willis, 426 S.C. 326, 337–38, 827 S.E.2d 167, 173 (2019). Second, the threshold questions — was a valid agreement to arbitrate ever formed, and did the signer have authority to bind the other person? — are for a court to decide, not an arbitrator. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944–45 (1995); Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296–97 (2010); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 n.1 (2006) (challenges going to whether any agreement was ever concluded are for the court).
Arredondo: even two powers of attorney were not enough
The centerpiece of South Carolina's law on this question is Arredondo v. SNH SE Ashley River Tenant, LLC, 433 S.C. 69, 856 S.E.2d 550 (2021). There, a daughter held both a General Durable Power of Attorney and a Health Care Power of Attorney for her father. When she signed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement as part of his admission to a care facility, the facility later argued those powers of attorney authorized her to do so.
The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed. Examining the specific language of each instrument, the Court held that neither power of attorney authorized the agent to execute a pre-dispute arbitration agreement on the principal's behalf. Arredondo, 433 S.C. at 78–86, 856 S.E.2d at 555–59. The reason is fundamental: agreeing to arbitration waives the constitutional right of access to the courts and to trial by jury, and waiver of that right requires express authority — not merely general authority to manage a person's affairs or health care. Critically, the Court's analysis turned on the nature of the right being given up, not on the type of facility involved.
The practical force of Arredondo is hard to overstate. If a validly executed, formal power of attorney — indeed, two of them — was still insufficient to authorize an arbitration waiver, then a relative who signs with no power of attorney and no court-appointed guardianship stands on far weaker ground.
When a family member signs with no legal authority at all
South Carolina's appellate courts have repeatedly declined to enforce arbitration agreements signed by relatives who lacked authority:
- Thompson v. Pruitt Corp., 416 S.C. 43, 784 S.E.2d 679 (Ct. App. 2016) — the Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a motion to compel arbitration where a family member signed admission documents for an incapacitated person. Authority to handle someone's finances or health-care decisions does not include authority to waive their day in court; and a person who lacked authority to sign cannot make the loved one a "third-party beneficiary" of the agreement either.
- Coleman v. Mariner Health Care, Inc., 407 S.C. 346, 755 S.E.2d 450 (2014) — the Supreme Court held that a surrogate's authority to make health-care decisions did not extend to a separate, optional arbitration agreement that "concerned neither health care nor payment."
- Stott v. White Oak Manor, Inc., 426 S.C. 568, 577, 828 S.E.2d 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2019) — a relative who signed an arbitration agreement for another lacked the authority to bind that person.
By statute, an incapacitated adult generally can be bound only through a properly executed power of attorney or a court-appointed guardian or conservator. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-101 et seq. (guardianship of incapacitated persons); § 62-8-101 et seq. (Uniform Power of Attorney Act).
A recent Charleston County illustration
These principles were on display in a 2026 Charleston County Court of Common Pleas case, Capo v. Active Day, Inc., No. 2025-CP-10-06032. A national adult day-care provider moved to compel arbitration of claims arising from the care it provided, relying on an arbitration agreement that a family member had signed for an adult participant with cognitive disabilities. The participant himself did not sign, and the family member held no power of attorney and no guardianship.
The Circuit Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The ruling tracks the throughline of the authorities above — and the lesson of Arredondo in particular: where the person to be bound never personally agreed, and the person who signed lacked the authority to waive that individual's constitutional right to a jury trial, there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. (The order is a matter of public record.)
Three additional hurdles for the business
Authority is not the only obstacle a company must clear:
- The Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to every contract. A company invoking the FAA must prove the contract actually "involves interstate commerce in fact"; reciting that "the FAA applies," or pointing to the parties' different home states, is not enough. Hicks Unlimited, Inc. v. Unifirst Corp., 439 S.C. 623, 889 S.E.2d 564 (2023). If the FAA does not apply, South Carolina's Uniform Arbitration Act controls, with its own requirements. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-10.
- Some claims fall outside even a broadly worded clause. South Carolina courts "will refuse to interpret any arbitration agreement as applying to outrageous torts that are unforeseeable to a reasonable consumer in the context of normal business dealings." Aiken v. World Finance Corp. of S.C., 373 S.C. 144, 151, 644 S.E.2d 705, 709 (2007).
- An electronic signature must actually be the person's. Under South Carolina's Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, the party relying on an e-signature bears the burden of proving it is attributable to the person to be bound. S.C. Code Ann. § 26-6-90.
Practical takeaways
- When you sign care or service paperwork for a loved one, recognize that an arbitration clause may attempt to surrender that person's right to a jury trial.
- Signing "on behalf of" another adult generally requires real legal authority to be effective for something this significant — and, as Arredondo shows, even a general power of attorney may not be enough without express authority to agree to arbitration.
- If a business later tries to force a dispute into arbitration based on paperwork a relative signed, the agreement's enforceability deserves a close look. It is not automatic.
This article is attorney advertising and general information about South Carolina law. It is not legal advice and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Outcomes depend on the specific facts of each case. If you have questions about a particular arbitration agreement or dispute, consult a licensed South Carolina attorney. Klok Law Firm, LLC — 1002 Anna Knapp Blvd., Suite 103, Mount Pleasant, SC 29464.