It is one of the most common questions parents ask, and it usually arrives with a number attached. Twelve. Fourteen. Sixteen. Someone at work or on a forum said that once a child reaches that age, the child decides. It would be simpler if that were true.

Where the child's preference actually sits

Custody is governed by S.C. Code § 63-15-240(B), which directs the family court to consider the best interest of the child and then lists the factors that consideration may include. The third is simply this: “the preferences of each child.”

That is the whole of it. One factor among seventeen. The statute attaches no age to it, gives it no special weight, and nowhere says it controls. It sits alongside the child's adjustment to home and school, the stability of each residence, each parent's ability to be involved, and the conduct factors about encouraging the other parent's relationship.

In practice a court will listen more closely to a mature sixteen-year-old than to a seven-year-old, and it will listen differently again if the preference looks coached. But listening more closely is not the same as being bound.

The mistake that turns a good position into a bad one

Here is where this question stops being academic. A parent hears the child say they do not want to go, decides the child is old enough to have a view, and stops sending them. That parent has now violated a court order.

The leading South Carolina decision is Noojin v. Noojin, 417 S.C. 300, 789 S.E.2d 769 (Ct. App. 2016). Over roughly two years a father received a small fraction of his ordered time with his two children. The mother's position was that she would not force them, and she coined the phrase “forced visitation” for what the order required. The Court of Appeals affirmed a finding of contempt against her:

The court described what the mother's own emails showed: that she refused to set a schedule, sought the children's guidance whenever the father tried to enforce the agreement, and told them she would never support forcing time with him. She was ordered to pay $41,375.84 towards the father's attorney's fees and costs.

The lesson is not that a parent must physically put a resisting teenager in a car. It is that passively deferring to the child, and telling the child the choice is theirs, is itself the violation.

Two limits the court was careful about

Noojin is not a rule that a parent is always in contempt when a child refuses. The Court of Appeals said so twice, and the qualifications matter as much as the holding.

The distinguishing feature was the absence of harm. Asked directly at oral argument whether visiting was causing the children any psychological or physical harm, the mother said it was not.

When the child's resistance is real

Contrast Nash v. Byrd, 298 S.C. 530, 381 S.E.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1989), which Noojin distinguishes. There a boy refused to get in the car for visitation. His mother dressed him for each visit, contacted his treating psychologist and her attorney, and offered to work with the father to resolve the problem; the father refused and simply demanded his visitation.

The psychologist advised that forcing the visits would likely bring back the child's earlier physical and emotional problems. The family court found the visitation problems were caused by the father's own conduct, that the mother had taken reasonable steps, and refused to hold her in contempt. It suspended visitation until the father completed counselling. The Court of Appeals found no error, noting that “[a] determination of contempt is a serious matter and should be imposed sparingly.”

The difference between the two cases is not the child's age or the strength of the child's feelings. It is whether the resisting was being caused by the other parent's conduct, whether the visits were genuinely harming the child, and whether the custodial parent took reasonable steps rather than simply deferring.

Where a child's safety or wellbeing is genuinely at issue, the route is a court order, not self-help. Our post on when South Carolina courts can suspend visitation rights covers those cases.

What to do when your child does not want to go

Our post on whether custody and visitation awards can be modified in South Carolina explains what a modification requires.

Frequently asked questions

At what age can my child decide in South Carolina?

There is no such age. The child's preference is one factor under § 63-15-240(B), and the statute attaches no age to it and does not make it controlling.

Will the judge talk to my child?

Sometimes, and how that happens is a matter for the court. What the statute guarantees is that the child's preferences are among the things the court may consider, not that the child will testify or choose.

My teenager refuses to go. Am I in contempt?

Not automatically. Noojin was limited to its facts and says contempt is decided case by case. What got the mother there was not the refusals themselves but her encouragement of them. If you are following the order, documenting what happens, and seeking help rather than deferring, you are in a materially different position.

What if visits are genuinely harming my child?

That changes the analysis, as Nash shows. But the answer is to go to court for relief, not to stop the visits on your own. A parent who stops unilaterally is the one explaining themselves at a contempt hearing.

Does what my child wants matter at all?

Yes. It is expressly one of the factors, and its practical weight grows with the child's age and maturity. It simply is not the decision, and it does not suspend an order.

Talk to a Charleston custody lawyer

If your child is resisting time with the other parent, the next few weeks matter more than the next few months, and the wrong response is expensive. Klok Law Firm handles South Carolina family law in Charleston, Mount Pleasant, Berkeley, and Dorchester counties. Call Klok Law at (843) 701-1695 to discuss your options.

This article is for general information only and is not legal advice. For advice about your specific situation, contact Klok Law at (843) 701-1695.